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ABSTRACT
By analyzing state governments’ efficiency in allocating fiscal resources, 
this study evalu-ates the efficiency of state public finances under the 
Malaysian fiscal federalism. This is reflected in the policies, strategies 
and decisions made to allocate public expenditure as this measurement 
would enable us to explain the institutional quality of the public sector in 
re-spect of the concept of regional competitiveness. In particular, states 
play important role in supporting the private sector and the market-based 
economy. The Data Envelopment Analy-sis (DEA) under the dynamic 
condition and Tobit panel data regression model are conducted on data for 
all the thirteen states in Malaysia from 1990 to 2009. The results of DEA 
reveal evidence that the current centralized fiscal federalism system has 
been unable to create a competitive environment among state governments, 
resulting in low levels of efficiency in the states. As an extension of the 
DEA, Tobit panel data regression model is needed to identify the factors 
that influence technical efficiency in Malaysia and the result showed 
evidence that fiscal decentralization had positive and significant influence 
on state efficiency level, but that further efficiency gains could have 
been realized with greater decentralization. Thus, this study supports the 
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, growing attention has been given to efficiency in the government sector 
(Tirtosuharto 2009) and many countries have turned to decentralization as a particularly 
effective way to promote efficiency. Build-ing on the classic works of Tiebout (1956), Musgrave 
(1959) and Oates (1972), Brennan and Buchanan (1980) have posited that fiscal decentraliza-
tion leads to increase in government efficiency through allocative/consumer and producer/
technical efficiency. Despite lack of empirical evidence this idea has won widespread acceptance 
(Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2003; Thieben 2003; Loehr and Manasan 1999). 
Fiscal decentralization is one of the major principles of the Market Pre-serving Federalism 
(MPF) model that emphasizes the importance of healthy competition among the lower 
governments (Jin, Qian, and Weingast 2005). Specifically, the cornerstone of the MPF model 
is a set of market-based prin-ciples that emphasizes the role of hard budget constraints, local 
autonomy, fiscal accountability and operational transparency (Grewal and Sheehan 2004). 
Past studies show that fiscal decentralization provides a greater incen-tive structure for state 
governments to become more efficient in allocating fiscal resources (Tirtosuharto 2009). In 
line with the concept of regional competitiveness, this study will evaluate the efficiency of 
state public financ-es under the Malaysian fiscal federalism.
Compared to other federations in both developed and developing countries, the federal 
system in Malaysia tends towards a more centralized structure as the distribution of functions 
is highly skewed towards federal government particularly in conducting financial relations (A 
Ghani 2014). The federal government collects relatively more revenue than the consolidat-ed 
state revenue by retaining all major revenue sources and powers of bor-rowing. Indeed, the 
monopoly of the revenue system provides a fundamental basis for the strong political power 
of the federal government and fosters a permanent dependency of the state governments on 
the federal government for development funds/transfers. This means that the centralized 
federal sys-tem in Malaysia empowers the federal government not only in regulating the 
development and location of industries but also in controlling the state’s share of expenditure 
allocation. In terms of expenditure assignment, the federal government incurs larger shares 
of total government expenditure, including all important functions such as education, health, 
transport and communica-tion. This leaves development of the states to be very much at the 
contention that fiscal decentralization provides incentive struc-tures to 
support higher state efficiency levels. The findings echo the main argument 
of Mar-ket Preserving Federalism theory that states become more efficient 
if more power is devolved to them whilst ensuring that they spend within 
their fiscal capacity. 
JEL Classification : H72; H77; E62; F34
Keywords: Efficiency, fiscal federalism, fiscal decentralization, market 
preserving federalism 
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discretion of the center. This is different from most other federations where the states are 
constitutionally responsible for the major areas of spending, particularly in the education and 
health arenas. Given this background, it is worth consid-ering whether MPF principles can 
place state governments in higher degree of responsibility, accountability and competition with 
one another, so the state governments become efficient and competitive which are crucial for 
promot-ing pro-development policies achieving higher regional economic growth.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Economists have long argued that federalism places subnational govern-ments in 
competition with one another (Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Oates 1972; Tiebout 1956). 
Competition gives subnational governments the incen-tive to foster local economic prosperity 
rather than costly market interven-tion, service to interest groups, and corruption. Market 
Preserving Federalism (MPF) highlights its belief in the value of competition as the most stable 
means of economic growth and that such competition can be created through the promotion of 
markets (Weingast 2009). Market preserving federalism (MPF) is a new addition to the growing 
literature on fiscal federalism, and represents an ideal (according to its proponents) type of 
fiscal federalism which seeks to re-establish government institutions and intergovernmental 
relations on market-based principles and to minimize rent-seeking behavior of governments 
(A Ghani 2014). In relation to the MPF concept, North (1995) has emphasized about the 
importance of efficient markets, which are impera-tive for the competitiveness and growth. 
Efficient markets require institu-tions, particularly the rule of law, and governments to provide 
positive market incentives by rewarding economic successes and punishing economic fail-
ures. Competition derived from decentralization would be able to control and limit the central 
government‘s interference in the lower level governments. More importantly, competition 
between subnational governments in attract-ing capital to their regions creates an externality 
which increases the oppor-tunity cost of subsidizing ailing firms, which in turn reduces the 
incentives to be bailed-out. Put another way, interjurisdictional competition provides polit-
ical officials with strong fiscal incentives to pursue policies that provide for a healthy local 
economy. Reducing conditions of competition among the states would result in the absence 
of state policy experimentation and innovation. 
From the viewpoint of regional competitiveness, decentralization is im-perative for 
increasing the power and capacity of a subnational government, sustain economic growth 
and improve standards of living. Viewed in this light, state government efficiency eventually 
is found to be the determining factor of competitiveness and growth at the regional level 
(Tirtosuharto 2009). The concept of regional competitiveness focuses on the capacity of 
subnational governments in stimulating and sustaining economic growth and development. 
Subnational governments can play an important role in support-ing the private sector and 
preserving a market economy. Hence, it is neces-sary to have in place a supportive system of 
governance, which will allow a subnational government to foster the process of development. 
Based on the competitiveness and allocative efficiency concepts, fiscal decentralization supports 
economic efficiency and intergovernmental competition (Bardhan 2002). Fiscal decentralization 
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is associated with expenditure and revenue allocation to accommodate district or regional 
economies for ensuring effi-cient delivery of public service provisions (Rao 2003).
An efficient economy is measured by its ability to efficiently allocate or distribute resources. 
This implies that states should optimize the use of their limited fiscal resources to serve the 
welfares of both individual citizens and firms, which is consistent with the principles of the 
Neoclassical theory. When measuring efficiency, a distinction can be made between technical 
and allocative allocative efficiency. According to Economic and Financial affairs (2008), 
technical efficiency measures the pure relation between inputs and outputs taking the production 
possibility frontier into account. Technical effi-ciency gains are a movement towards this 
production possibility frontier (best practice). However, not every form of technical efficiency 
makes economic sense, and this is captured by allocative efficiency. Allocative efficiency re-
flects the link between the optimal combination of inputs taking into account costs and benefits 
and the output. 
There are also some counterarguments showing a decline in efficiency under decentralized 
systems. Firstly, if subnational governments operate on a lower production frontier than the 
central government, then decentralization leads to a decline in the quantity or quality of 
public good output, and is like-ly to retard economic growth. Also, it is not always possible 
to accurately measure the tastes of preferences as the allocative efficiency gains from de-
centralization of service provision at local levels would then be much less than anticipated 
(McNab 2001). Whether fiscal decentralization actually leads to allocative efficiency in practice 
or not is questionable, particularly in situations where subnational governments lack the 
technical expertise or re-sources to translate their knowledge of local preferences into effective 
poli-cies. There is no apparent consensus in the literature that fiscal decentraliza-tion results 
in increased producer/technical efficiency, and there is also little discussion on how potential 
efficiency gains can be translated into increased economic growth. In fact, Prud‘homme (1995) 
argues that fiscal decentraliza-tion can increase disparities, jeopardize stability and undermine 
efficiency. Indeed Tanzi (2000) argued that higher incidences of moral hazard can occur at the 
state level, particularly when states lack the ability to manage debt, budget deficits exist, and 
good incentives to encourage the efficient alloca-tion of resources, hence offsetting the benefit 
of fiscal decentralization as well as increasing the risk to the fiscal and macroeconomic stability 
of both federal and state government.
Based on the framework of fiscal decentralization, the allocation of fiscal resources is 
primarily related to state spending or expenditure. The choices made by the state government 
for expenditure determine the degree of public capital accumulation which is identified as the 
key factor of growth and de-velopment by both Classical and Neoclassical theory. Samuelson 
(1954) pre-sented the idea of common public goods that focused on optimal public spending 
rather than taxation. In particular, the importance of public expendi-ture in the economy is 
related to the major role played by the government. However, Tiebout (1956) extended such 
concept by linking public expendi-ture and Neoclassical theory of capital stock. Capital stock 
plays a key role in determining output levels, and will change over time as a result of additional 
investments and depreciation of capital stock. In Solow‘s (2000) growth mod-el, capital 
along with the growth of the labor force, are found to be the main factors of production. The 
production function in the Solow model is based on the extent of efficiency or productivity 
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of labor and capital. Although, there was lack of discussion on the role of public capital, 
Neoclassical theory pro-vides a basis to understand the key issues of public capital and output 
growth. Accumulation of public capital stock provides a rationale for government involvement 
in the market economy through public investments as an attempt to support private sector 
production. Public expenditure influences economic growth through three channels: aggregate 
demand, resource allocation and income distribution. First, public inputs through government 
expenditure in-crease production and aggregate demand as the Neoclassical theory views 
public capital stock as a function of the marginal utility theory with respect to consumption 
(Tiebout 1956; Samuelson 1954). As a result of higher produc-tivity, production increases as 
consumers derive utilities from public capital stock (Arrow 1970). Thus, it is imperative for 
state governments to provide incentives for the private sector to invest and produce (Aschauer 
1989). Barro (1990) emphasized that public capital is considered an input to production and a 
complement of private capital, hence allocation of state fiscal resources in productive public 
capital investment would reduce the costs of production and increase output of firms due to 
higher productivity. Therefore, regions compete to support higher return on capital investments 
to the private sector (Siebert 1996; Munnell 1992). However, increasing public expenditure 
can lower the aggregate investment and consumption in the private sector. This situation is 
referred to crowding-out in which public capital acts as a substi-tute to private capital and 
at the same time hinders incentives for private sec-tor investment. Subsequently, increase in 
public expenditure results in the cost of higher taxes to finance public investments. Empirical 
studies suggest that there should be a balance between investments from public and private 
capital (Munnell 1992). Since the government intervention reduces the opti-mality of resource 
allocation, the questions are whether the share of public spending is significantly large compared 
to the national economy and wheth-er the government should be directly involved in production, 
which could increase inefficiencies from waste spending, rent seeking, and corruption practices. 
Such issues are imperative for the implementation of fiscal decen-tralization particularly in 
developing countries where the extent of inefficien-cy is greater than in developed countries 
(Tirtosuharto 2009). 
METHODOLOGY
A two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method is used to esti-mate technical efficiency 
of state governments. In the first stage, the efficient frontier and the state government-level 
efficiency scores are first estimated using DEA under dynamic condition. This dynamic 
condition or time de-pendent setting in DEA is able to observe excessive use of resources that 
are intended to produce future outputs (Charnes, Cooper, and Gorlarry 1985). In the second 
stage, the estimated DEA efficiency scores are regressed on some institutional and contextual/
environmental variables using a Tobit model for all the thirteen states in Malaysia from 1990 
to 2009.
Data Envelopment Analysis is an important non-parametric method that measures the 
relative performance of certain decision making units (DMU) through a multifactor productivity 
analysis module for measuring the relative efficiency on DMUs. In other words, it is an 
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analytical tool which assists the identification of best practices in the use of resources among 
a group of or-ganisations. Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) pioneered the method of DEA 
which is based on a mathematical programming production frontier approach. In this model 
called the CCR model, the frontier is constructed using a piecewise linear combination that 
has connection with the set of ‘best practices observations’ in the sample, yielding a convex 
efficient frontier, and existent values of DMUs are compared to the constructed frontier. The 
major advantage of the DEA approach is that it does not require any assumption about the 
function form, making it particularly suitable for analysing multiple inputs and multiple outputs 
production systems (Rayeni 2012). 
According to (Farrel 1957), technical efficiency refers to a condition when given a set of 
outputs, a minimum quantity of inputs are required and vice versa. The technical efficiency 
of a DMU is computed as the ratio of output produced to input consumed as shown below. 
Technical Efficiency = ∑weighted outputs/∑ weighted inputs   (1)
In general, the basic concept of efficiency measurement is based on the ratio of total outputs 
to total inputs with the objective to select a set of input and outputs that are relevant to the 
evaluation of performance and show a moderate statistical relationship (Al Eraqi, Mustafa, and 
Khader 2010). Tech-nical efficiency as measured by DEA can be identified by using an input 
or output orientation. In this study, DEA model is based on input orientation as it pertains to 
the capability of state governments in maximizing output gener-ated from a limited amount of 
public spending as input. In the input-oriented model, inputs are controllable and DMUs are 
deemed to generate a given amount of outputs with the smallest possible amount of inputs. The 
technical efficiency score is measured with state revenue and private investments as the outputs 
of the model, while state spending, including capital expenditure and current expenditure, are 
considered as the input variables. 
Following a number of suggestions in the literature, this study employed public expenditure 
as the input to measure efficiency of states (Tirtosuharto 2009; Herrera and Pang 2005). 
Although DEA measures relative efficiency, each DMU is assumed to have a sufficient number 
of units with absolute technical efficiency and the DEA analysis is seen capable of continuously 
improving their performance (Thanassoulis 2001). In the first step, Granger causality test is 
performed to identify a stronger causal relationship between the input and output variables. 
Homogeneity is the main criterion of DMU as it uses the same input resources to produce 
output and yet, each unit of as-sessment has a ‘decision’ control mechanism to convert inputs 
into outputs. Therefore, this technical efficiency analysis is actually an analysis of spend-ing 
or expenditure efficiency. The input and output data were obtained from the state governments 
(eg. State financial report), Ministry of Finance (MOF) and National Audit Department (eg. 
Auditor’s general report). 
In state spending, the variable of capital expenditure includes spending on various public 
investments, such as infrastructure, health and education, and current expenditure includes 
other non-investment expenditures on opera-tions and public goods provision. Because of the 
nature of typical public fixed investments where there is a time lag for a project or program to 
be fully op-erated, the data used has a one year lag. Spending on capital investment pro-jects 
or services generates revenue for states either directly through fees or charges, or indirectly 
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through tax collections driven by private sector devel-opment. The level of private investment 
is also affected by state decisions to invest in capital projects, particularly in connection with 
public service deliv-ery. The availability of infrastructure, such as transportation networks, tele-
communication, and electricity would be part of the consideration when mak-ing a decision to 
invest in a region. The expansion of state expenditure will also boost government consumption, 
expand market demand, and potentially induce private investment in the region. This is similar 
to the concept of the multiplier effect which posits that government spending can lead to higher 
economic growth. The two output variables in the DEA model are state reve-nue and private 
domestic investment. State revenue includes taxes, fees and charges, but it excludes transfers 
from the federal government. Some of the state revenue also comes from profits generated by 
state owned enterprises (SOEs), such as state local banks and public utilities organizations.
Specifically for this study, The DEA under dynamic condition (time de-pendent method), 
which is also known as window analysis, has been used to measure changes in performance 
of the states over time. The properties of the window analysis are measured as below: With 
thirteen DMUs (n) and twenty years of observation (k), this study uses a five year window 
length (p) to ex-amine the consistency of the scores. The numerical illustration that defines 
the application of window analysis is: 
Formula Application 
No. of windows w = k – p + 1 , w = 20 – 5 +1 = 16 
No. of DMUs in each window = np /2 , 13 x 5 / 2 = 32.5 
No. of different DMUs = np (k – p + 1), 13 x 5 (20 – 5 +1) = 1040
Since this study covers a twenty-year period (k=20), substantial differ-ences can be 
expected in state governments because there would have been a lot of changes in the laws 
and policies, technology employed and other struc-tural changes in the market place in that 
period. The window length (width or p) is selected on a trial and error basis, so a five- year 
window (width = 5) was found to be appropriate as it coincides with the five year-duration 
of econom-ic planning followed in the New Economic Policy (NEP). A different set of data 
is made for each window and each state is represented as a different DMU at each interval of 
five successive years. Thus, following Pjevcevic et al. (2011), the results of various DMUs per 
five-year window are derived to measure differences in efficiency-performance of states. With 
this method, the performance of DMU in one period is compared not only with the perfor-
mance of other DMUs but also with its own performance in other periods. Sixteen windows 
are represented as sixteen rows per one state based on w = k- p +1. The test was conducted on 
variable return to scale (VRS) where a rise in inputs is expected to result in disproportionate 
rise in outputs (Banker, Charnes, and Cooper 1984) because DMUs cannot operate optimally 
due to limited resources, imperfect competition and institutional issues.
As an extension of the DEA, Tobit panel data regression model is needed to identify the 
factors that influence technical efficiency in Malaysia. More importantly, it also identifies 
factors that attributable to the efficiency in MPF. The two output variables in the DEA model 
are state revenue and pri-vate investment. In this regression model, the average efficiency levels 
of thirteen states in Malaysia over the twenty years (1990-2009) are treated as the dependent 
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variable (EFF), while FD, lnCAPEX, lnOPEREX, lnSGDPPC, lnEXPPC and LESSDUM are 
the independent variables. 
A variety of regression techniques have been applied in the second stage to estimate the 
impact of contextual factors on efficiency, including the ordi-nary least squares (OLS) and the 
maximum likelihood (ML) based probit, logit, and truncated regression (Tobit). A debate has 
been ranging between two views over the statistical properties of the two-stage DEA estimator. 
Si-mar and Wilson (2007) argue that because DEA output scores are biased and contextual/
environmental variables are correlated to output and input varia-bles, the conventional statistical 
inferences are invalid in the second-stage regression, and recommend use of bootstrap methods. 
On the other hand, Ramalho et al.(2010), McDonald (2008) and Ruggiero (2004) have argued 
that econometric models such as probit, logit, and truncated regression (To-bit) can be used 
for second-stage estimation of the impact of contextu-al/environmental variables on efficiency. 
Afonso and Aubyn (2011) argue that “Even if Tobit results are possibly biased, it is not clear 
that bootstrap estimates are necessarily more reliable, based on a set of assumptions con-cerning 
the data generation process and the perturbation term distribution that may be distributed 
(p.1429).” In their empirical study, the censored normal Tobit results and bootstrap algorithms 
yielded very similar results. We esti-mated the Tobit model (or censored normal regression 
model) because DEA efficiency estimates are bounded between 0 and 1.
In the Tobit model, for computational convenience it is preferable to as-sume a censoring 
point at zero (Greene 1993). The Tobit model is formulated as follows (McDonald and Moffit 
1980):
y* = βixi + εi
yi = yi*     if        yi* >0
yi = 0         if        yi* ≤0        i=1,2,…,N                     (2)
where: N is the number of observations; yi is the observed inefficiency score, i.e. dependent 
variable; y* is the latent dependent variable; βi is the kx1 vector of unknown parameters; x1 
is the kx1 vector of explanatory/independent variables; and εi is an independently distributed 
error term assumed to be normal with zero mean and constant variance σ2.
Some relevant institutional and operating environment variables were omitted due to the 
dearth of data. Therefore, the estimated empirical model was:
Eff=α+β1FD+β2CAPEX+β3OPREX+β4SGDPPC+ β5EXPPC+β6LESSDUM+ εi   (3)
where: EFF is the efficiency score; FD is the degree of fiscal decentralization from the revenue 
dimension which has the advantage of incorporating the aspect of tax collection in fiscal 
decentralisation (Ebel and Yilmaz 2003; Fisman and Gatti 2000; Davoodi and Zou 1998); 
CAPEX is the capital ex-penditure; OPREX is the operating expenditure; SGDPPC is state 
gross do-mestic income per capita; EXPPC is expenditure per capita; LESSDUM is less 
developed state dummies; α is the intercept term; β1 is the vector of un-known parameters 
or coefficients; and ε1 is the stochastic/random error term. The magnitude of likelihood for 
each factor determinant is measured by the marginal effect and relevant factors are identified 
according to the degree of significance (z-ratio). As Tobit panel data model is inherently non-
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linear in the coefficients, its estimated parameter does not by themselves respect mar-ginal 
effects of the explanatory variable on the dependent variable. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 1a and 1b compile the results of the window analysis for seven and six Malaysian’s states 
respectively where technical efficiency scores have been calculated as the average score in 
each window year. The VRS efficiency score represents pure technical efficiency, which is a 
measure of efficiency without scale efficiency (Avkiran 2001). The states that have an efficiency 
score of 1.00 or 100% are considered to be efficient and they lie on the effi-cient frontier. A 
higher technical efficiency score indicates a higher spending efficiency level or can be simply 
interpreted as a better allocation efficiency of fiscal resources by state governments. The results 
for both Tables (Table 1a and Table 1b) show that the average efficiency level for all states in 
Ma-laysia was less than 1.00 with fluctuating trends over the twenty year period (1990-2009). 
Table 1a. Technical Efficiency In Malaysia’s States 1990-2009
INPUT Indicators: (1) Capital Expenditure, (2) Current Expenditure
OUTPUT Indicators: (1) State Government Revenue, (2) Private Investments




1990 1.00 0.96 0.80 0.92 1.00 0.40 0.55
1991 1.00 0.62 0.89 1.00 1.00 0.38 0.97
1992 0.34 0.58 0.75 0.92 1.00 0.35 0.96
1993 0.39 0.49 0.73 0.78 0.90 0.34 0.43
1994 0.35 0.35 0.55 0.70 0.95 0.35 0.44
1995 0.34 0.32 0.61 0.66 0.56 0.29 0.57
1996 0.35 0.32 0.57 0.47 0.55 0.32 0.48
1997 0.31 0.27 0.60 0.41 0.45 0.57 0.49
1998 0.25 0.38 0.60 0.44 0.44 0.40 0.26
1999 0.19 0.39 0.63 0.82 0.41 0.34 0.40
2000 0.17 0.36 0.62 0.73 0.46 0.50 0.56
2001 0.19 0.36 0.53 0.57 0.46 0.36 0.28
2002 0.17 0.36 0.43 0.30 0.31 0.59 0.29
2003 0.20 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.39 0.34
2004 0.22 0.29 0.26 0.27 0.62 0.43 0.35
2005 0.33 0.21 0.32 0.32 0.35 0.49 0.30
2006 0.25 0.17 0.26 0.39 0.33 0.43 0.28
2007 0.69 1.00 0.22 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.23
2008 1.00 0.13 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.36 0.31
2009 0.15 0.13 0.31 0.24 0.31 0.32 0.26
AVERAGE 0.39 0.40 0.51 0.55 0.56 0.40 0.44
Note: Efficiency scores are within the range of 0 to 1, with 1 means the most efficient
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The efficiency levels were even worse during the economic crises in 1997-1998 and in 
2008-2009 and decreased significantly in those times1. The results for the efficiency level for 
each state are mixed, but overall the aver-age efficiency level for thirteen states was around 0.56 
or 56%, which can also be interpreted as 44% shortfall with reference to the efficiency frontier. 
Among the developed states (Selangor, Penang, Johor, Melaka, Negri Sembilan and 
Perak), surprisingly, Selangor which is known as the richest state in the country, had an average 
efficiency level around 0.49 over the twenty years and this level has not surpassed 0.5 since 
1997. Johor was the most inefficient compared to other states as it had an average around 0.39. 
In contrast, Penang appeared to be the most efficient among the states as the efficiency level 
was an average of 0.72, followed by Negri Sembilan and Melaka (0.56 and 0.55 respectively).
Table 1b. Technical Efficiency In Malaysia’s States 1990-2009
INPUT Indicators: (1) Capital Expenditure, (2) Current Expenditure
OUTPUT Indicators: (1) State Government Revenue, (2) Private Investments
Year Perlis Penang Selangor Terengganu Sabah Sarawak
1990 1.00 0.97 0.55 1.00 0.98 0.65
1991 0.91 1.00 0.45 0.87 0.70 0.87
1992 0.76 0.76 0.48 0.77 0.99 0.77
1993 1.00 0.63 0.63 0.91 0.74 0.67
1994 1.00 0.71 0.80 0.77 1.00 0.57
1995 0.75 0.59 0.74 0.68 0.78 0.59
1996 0.82 0.65 1.00 0.65 0.68 0.62
1997 0.72 0.52 0.69 0.68 0.70 0.52
1998 0.72 0.42 0.47 0.80 0.72 0.48
1999 0.75 0.67 0.35 0.73 0.70 0.56
2000 0.79 0.53 0.48 0.83 0.56 0.48
2001 0.76 0.52 0.38 0.69 0.61 0.72
2002 0.80 0.69 0.27 1.00 0.64 0.82
2003 0.62 0.91 0.34 0.59 0.75 0.91
2004 0.75 0.96 0.38 0.89 0.78 0.91
2005 0.53 1.00 0.37 0.90 0.55 0.94
2006 0.76 0.76 0.40 0.58 0.52 0.96
2007 0.72 0.67 0.33 0.36 0.44 0.83
2008 0.56 0.83 0.30 1.00 0.42 1.00
2009 0.50 0.54 0.34 0.38 0.62 0.72
AVERAGE 0.76 0.72 0.49 0.75 0.69 0.73
 Note: Efficiency scores are within the range of 0 to 1, with 1 means the most efficient
It is often assumed that developed states are more competent in man-aging their fiscal 
allocation due to their strengths in human resources, man-agement system and technologies. 
1  During the financial crises, there were greater constraints on fiscal resources resulting from lower revenue and limited 
transfers from the federal government. At the same time, the need for spending kept increasing which led to cut in capital 
expenditure that was allocated for supporting critical infrastructures. As a result, private investment and state resources 
de-clined as state became less competitive.
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They are also expected to have a higher productivity of public capital investments because of 
economies of scale and positive externalities driven by them (Tirtosuharto 2009). These figures 
pro-vide evidence that more developed states have weak incentives and low de-centralization 
in planning an effective strategy and priority to utilize their fiscal resources to support 
development. This could be the case with a state like Selangor which has had little incentive.
In order to achieve high efficiency despite achieving high growth and better local economic 
performance compared to other states. Being the clos-est to the capital city of Kuala Lumpur 
and administration center Putrajaya, Selangor shares land and developments with federal 
government. It has bene-fitted from many federal government projects and attracts many 
foreign in-vestors as well as highly skilled and educated labors. But, Selangor was among the 
least efficient states indicating that more expenditure for the state also created more room for 
fiscal leakages and misallocation of resources and inefficiencies.
The situation is again similar to that found in Indonesia by Tirtosuharto (2009) where 
resource-rich states were not always more efficient as higher levels of state spending leads to 
higher levels of inefficiency. In the case of less-developed states (Pahang, Kedah, Kelantan, 
Perlis, Terengganu, Sabah and Sarawak)2, three oil-producing states with high revenue were 
more effi-cient than other states in Malaysia, with Terengganu being the highest with 0.75 
followed by Sarawak 0.73 and Sabah 0.69. Kelantan, which is considered the poorest state, 
has an average efficiency level of 0.51 that is almost equivalent to other states. Despite being 
ruled by the opposition party for more than two decades, Kelantan has managed to allocate 
their resources as efficiently as other state governments, even under the constraint of possible 
hostility and discrimination from the federal government, which has been alleged in the past. 
Surprisingly, Perlis, which is known to have fewer re-sources, was the most efficient state 
in Malaysia with an average efficiency level of 0.76 over the twenty years and scored 1.00 
three times in the 1990s. Perlis seems to have had the capability to allocate expenditure and 
resources to productive investments that contribute to the growth of the private sector and the 
market economy at the state level. Sabah and Sarawak (Borneo states) have a special position 
in the Federal Constitution (Jalil 2008) and have been devolved more resources with special 
grants and more responsibilities com-pared to other states in Peninsular Malaysia, so it seems 
inappropriate to make any comparison between them and other states. 
All of the oil-producing states actually enjoyed 5% petroleum royalties from the federal 
government giving them more revenue to spend on their de-velopment. Specifically, Terengganu 
managed to achieve full efficiency level of 1.00 in 1990 and 2002, indicating that the capital 
expenditure was effi-ciently allocated and the cost of operating expenditure successfully mini-
mized. With the advantage of being one of the highest revenue recipient states, Terengganu 
had more incentives to expand its scope of expenditure that could address specific needs of its 
people, deliver basic public services and maintain state‘s assets. The results are inconclusive, 
so that the level of state efficiency will be determined by the state‘s fiscal capacity is not 
proved by the data. This is consistent with the findings of Tirtosuharto (2009) in In-donesia 
who also found that not all developed states are efficient and not all less developed states are 
inefficient. The results have shown that in a central-ized system, the federal government has 
2 These states have lower real SGDP than the developed states that are located in the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia. 
This was caused by the lag of development and the fact that states in eastern region (except for Kedah and Perlis are in 
northern region) are geograph-ically and historically disadvantages.
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failed to address specific needs of each state resulting in low efficiency level, the decrease in 
the efficiency and effectiveness of state resource allocations. Therefore, the findings support 
the importance of fiscal decentralization for fulfilling the requirements of MPF theory. 
In general, under the current system of fiscal federalism, all states, whether more or less 
developed, are not able to utilize their abundant fiscal resources efficiently. Some states that 
are rich in resources have a tendency to spend more in proportion to their large fiscal capacity 
which leads to higher level of efficiency. It can be concluded that the efficiency of different 
states can fluctuate over time to different extents, and as a whole, the efficiency levels in state 
governments had no improvement over the twenty year period. Lack of competitiveness among 
the state governments from greater centrali-zation is identified as the primary factor of the low 
efficiency level. Indeed, less fiscal competition discourages spending on public inputs, including 
spending to attract mobile labor and capital, as found in a study on German counties by Borck 
(2005). Limited revenue resources as well as soft budget constraint are among the factors that 
demotivate them, especially their state officials, from becoming more innovative and efficient 
in allocating their resources. Thus, fiscal leakages due to corruption or rent seeking behavior 
would arise as a result of failure to satisfy the MPF requirements, particularly, decentralization 
in economic authority and hard budget constraints.
Table 2, the results of Tobit panel data regression reveal the factors that determine the 
technical efficiency of the state governments. The average ef-ficiency levels of thirteen states 
in Malaysia over the twenty years (1990-2009) are treated as the dependent variable (EFF), 
while FD, lnCAPEX, lnOPEREX, lnSGDPPC, lnEXPPC and LESSDUM are the independent 
varia-bles. 
Table 2. Determinants of state technical efficiency in Malaysia, 1990- 2009
Dependent Variable: EFF N*T = 260 Observations (13 States)
Variables Coefficient z-ratio Marginal
FD (Fiscal Decentral-ization) 0.182 3.280***  0.182
lnCAPEX (Capital Expenditure) -0.108 -4.640*** -0.107
lnOPREX (Operating Expenditure) 0.005  0.230 -0.005
lnSGDPPC (Real SGDP Per capita) 0.037 0.860 0.037
lnEXPPC (Expendi-ture Per capita) 0.134 3.340*** 0.134
LESSDUM (Less Developed State Dummies)   0.063 1.400  0.062
Constant 1.222 - -
Log-Likelihood  -20.183
Wald Chi2 44.25
Note:  *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** for 5% level and * for 10% level. Instead, the marginal effects are 
functions of both the parameters and the data (Wooldridge 2006; McDonald and Moffit 1980). 
In the Tobit panel data regression model, the magnitude of likelihood for each factor 
determinant is measured by the marginal effect and relevant fac-tors are identified according 
to the degree of significance (z-ratio). As Tobit panel data model is inherently non-linear in 
the coefficients, its estimated parameter does not by themselves respect marginal effects of the 
explanatory variable on the dependent variable. All the coefficients in the model, except for 
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real SGDP per capita (SGDPPC), operating expenditure (OPREX) and less developed state 
dummies (LESSDUM), are significant at the 1% level.
This reveals that technical efficiency is influenced by all the remaining determinants and 
confirms the robustness of the twenty year observations model for identifying these factors. 
The coefficient FD has a positive sign with the highest marginal effect of 0.182 and significant 
at 1% level indicat-ing that fiscal decentralization is the most important factor for the technical 
efficiency level compared to other factors. This demonstrates that when state governments are 
given the opportunity to determine their spending according to their needs and priorities, they 
avoid unnecessary spending and achieve higher efficiency. This advantage is consistent with 
MPF literature which stipulates that devolution of fiscal freedom to states provides them the 
incen-tives to allocate their fiscal resources efficiently.
From the dimension of revenue, states that are able to generate their own revenue/ 
have extra revenues tend to not be dependent on federal government transfers, for example, 
the oil producing states are more likely to be more efficient in managing the level of 
fiscal decentralization (see Table 1a and Table 1b, DEA results). In addition, higher fiscal 
decentralization implies that states‘ administrators could become more responsible to ensure 
that more revenues can be generated for state budgets, particularly in generating reve-nues to 
close the fiscal gap in their budget. More importantly, local revenue generation makes local 
governments more responsive to citizens, reduces corruption and increases the incentives 
to provide market enhancing public goods as claimed by the Second Generation of Fiscal 
Federalism Theories (SGFF) (Weingast 2009). Therefore, the result demonstrates that fiscal 
decen-tralization provides incentives for states to become more efficient in allocat-ing fiscal 
resources. 
The results for productive spending as proxied by capital expenditure (CAPEX) is negative 
and significant at 1% level, which means that it is likely to reduce the technical efficiency level. 
Productive spending (capital ex-penditure) is an important variable indicating the ability of 
states to allocate resources efficiently for public welfare and long term development. Since 
capital expenditure (CAPEX) shows negative association, this could mean that there are 
leakages in capital spending and the state governments have no proper spending in allocating 
the resources in the states. This is reflected in the case of Selangor which has been endowed 
with many development pro-jects, but has low efficiency level due to inefficiencies in the 
allocation of capital expenditure. Therefore, productive spending shows unexpected in-verse 
correlation than the assumption of productive spending leads to higher level of state efficiency. 
Generally, effective spending is assumed to indicate the ability of the state in allocating 
resources sufficiently, particularly for public welfare and long term development. The model 
demonstrates that the level of expenditure per capita is positively associated with technical 
effi-ciency level. The level of spending per capita (EXPPC) has a positive mar-ginal effect 
and is significant at 1% level.
Lastly, SGDPPC, OPREX and LESSDUM variables have neutral effects on the increase 
in technical efficiency score. The results for the less devel-oped states‘ dummy variable 
(LESSDUM) indicate that there are no differ-ences in terms of technical efficiency levels 
between states (developed and less developed) despite variances in the capability and capacity 
of state to manage fiscal affairs and public capital investments. This validates the find-ing in the 
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last section which shows that efficiency is not related to the devel-opment level of the state and 
also means that a separate panel model for less developed states is not needed in this analysis. 
In conclusion, fiscal decentral-ization is an important determinant of technical efficiency in 
Malaysia. It could provide incentives to state governments to become more competitive and 
more efficient.
The results of DEA reveal evidence of the inefficiency of Malaysian state governments 
particularly from the aspect of public expenditure. In this case, Malaysia‘s centralized fiscal 
federalism system has been unable to create a competitive environment among Malaysian 
state governments resulting in low levels of efficiency in Malaysian states. The dependency of 
states on the federal government for transfers/grants or soft budget constraints has encour-aged 
improper fiscal discipline in the states as they spend money without hav-ing responsibility 
to raise additional own revenue. However, this analysis does not capture other causes of 
inefficiencies such as corruption or rent-seeking behavior that might take place in the system 
due to less state gov-ernment incentives. The Tobit panel data regression identified many 
determi-nants of state efficiency. State governments which have failed to mobilize their tax 
potentials to the maximum and continue to rely on federal grants/transfers 247 show lower 
efficiency. Federal grants/transfers may stimulate more spending by state governments leading 
them to increase their spending beyond their means, engage in more corruption, provide non-
remunerative benefits to interest groups and give endless subsidies to ineffi-cient enterprises. 
These tests provide evidence that fiscal decentralization with hard budget constraints can 
improve state efficiency levels.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
One policy that can raise state efficiency levels is the decision to allow states to generate their 
own revenues (strengthening fiscal capacities). States' finances need to be strengthened to 
minimize states' dependence on the center for funds. It is necessary to reassign independent 
sources of revenue to the state for strengthening a state finances. By appropriate reassignment 
of feder-ally controlled taxes to states, states would be guaranteed a stable revenue inflow. 
Certain taxes, particularly those taxes that are localized in nature, are better assigned to the 
states as states can manage and collect them more effi-ciently. Among revenue sources which 
could be reassigned to the state based on this principle are property tax, stamp duties, and road 
tax (tax on vehicles) as well as production and consumption taxes as such excise duties, sales 
and service taxes (Musgrave 1983). Since land matters are the responsibility of the states, any 
taxes related to landed property, such as estate duty, real prop-erty gains tax and stamp duty on 
land transfers, are appropriately assigned to the states, with policy determined by the federal 
authority for uniformity pur-poses. The respective state governments could then determine 
their own tax rates, depending on prevailing local economic preferences. 
It is important to support policies that promote good governance. These policies should 
encourage transparency, accountability and the rule of law. In many developing countries, 
one factor that has negatively influenced the effi-ciency and productivity of public capital 
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expenditure is corruption and rent-seeking activities 3. State institutions should have strong 
good governance policies in place, otherwise decentralization will not be effective 4.
Growth policies at the state level should take into consideration the in-vestment needs of 
the private sector. Private capital investment at the state level is affected by labor and population 
growth in addition to public goods and services that are provided by the state. From the supply 
side, skilled labor is a key production input for firms and enterprises. From the demand side, the 
private sector‘s decision to invest is driven by population growth, which ulti-mately determines 
what and where to produce. 
Here, our findings echo the main argument of Market Preserving Federal-ism (MPF) theory 
that states become more efficient if more power is de-volved to them whilst ensuring that they 
spend within their fiscal capacity. When the federal government loosens the constraints on 
states, states have the incentive to become innovative and competitive, and fiscal independence 
and economic growth can be improved significantly. More importantly, the im-portance of 
grants will be diminished, but fiscal responsibility and fiscal ac-countability will be increased. 
Malaysia also needs to take rigorous steps to improve state governments efficiency level through 
the system of fiscal de-centralization and incentives proposed by the MPF theory. 
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